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Introduction
One justication for positive capital income taxation is that the goods preferred by high-ability individuals
ought to be taxed because the consumption of these goods provides a signal of individualsotherwise un-
observable ability.1 ;2 If individualsabilities are positively related to preferences for saving, this argument
implies that capital income should be taxed. Two prominent expositions of this justication are Saez (2002)
and Banks and Diamond (2009). Saez shows that a small linear tax on a commodity preferred by individuals
with higher ability generates a smaller e¢ ciency loss than does an increase in the optimal nonlinear income
tax that raises the same revenue from each individual. He applies this logic to capital income taxation and
concludes "...the discount rate  is probably negatively correlated with skills. This suggests that interest
income ought to be taxed even in the presence of a non-linear optimal earnings tax." Banks and Diamond
(2009) is the chapter on direct taxation in the Mirrlees Review. Commissioned by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies, the Review is the successor to the inuential Meade Report of 1978 and is the authoritative summary
of the current state of tax theory as it relates to policy. Their chapter concludes:
"With the plausible assumption that those with higher earnings abilities discount the future less
(and thus save more out of any given income), then taxation of saving helps with the equity-
e¢ ciency tradeo¤ by being a source of indirect evidence about who has higher earnings abilities
and thus contributes to more e¢ cient redistributive taxation."
In this paper, we analytically and quantitatively study this justication for taxing goods preferred by
those with high ability, in particular future consumption (i.e., saving), when commodity taxes are allowed
to be nonlinear functions of both income and consumption.3
We rst derive analytical expressions that indicate the shape of optimal commodity taxation. We start
in a two-type, two-commodity economy and demonstrate that the high ability type faces no distortion to its
chosen commodity basket while the low type faces a distortion away from consumption of the good preferred
by the high type. In other words, marginal taxes are regressive on the good preferred by those with high
ability.4 We then derive the condition describing optimal commodity taxes in an economy with two goods and
a continuum of types where the relative preference for one good rises with ability. The marginal commodity
tax on the good preferred by the able is again equal to zero for the highest type, and it is positive for lower-
ability types. As is common in Mirrleesian models (e.g., Saez 2001) we then analytically study the forces
for and against regressivity in the tax on the good preferred by the able. The intuition for why regressive
commodity taxation on such a good may be optimal starts with the realization that the goal of optimal tax
1This result originated in Mirrlees (1976) and also appears in Mirrlees (1986). Nearly all comprehensive treatments of
modern tax policy contain a section on this result as a deviation from the standard Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) recommendation
of uniform commodity taxation. Tuomala (1991) writes "...the marginal tax rates on commodities that the more able people
tend to prefer should be greater;" Salanie (2003) warns "If there is a positive correlation between the taste for ne wines and
productivity, then ne wines should be taxed relatively heavily (God Forbid!);" while Kaplow (2008) argues "it tends to be
optimal to impose a heavier burden on commodities preferred by the more able and a lighter burden on those preferred by
the less able." Enthusiasm for this result may be because, as Mirrlees put it "This prescription is most agreeable to common
sense."
2A di¤erent justication for the positive capital wedge is the New Dynamic Public Finance literature (see e.g., Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski 2003; Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning 2006; Kocherlakota 2009).
3Though most research on this issue has focused on the linear tax problem, Mirrlees (1976, 1986) is clear that his results
apply to nonlinear marginal commodity tax rates. A few later authors also noted the potential for optimal nonlinear rates:
e.g., Kaplow (2008). Banks and Diamond (2009) look for but nd no work on the nonlinear problem. They write: "In the
context of this issue, how large the tax on capital income should be and how the marginal capital income tax rates should vary
with earnings levels has not been explored in the literature that has been examined."
4The ip side of this regressive tax on the good preferred by the high ability is a progressive subsidy on the good not preferred
by the high ability. Throughout the paper, we describe the optimal policy in terms of its e¤ects on the goods preferred by the
high ability, in keeping with the existing literatures emphasis on capital taxation.
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policy (in the Mirrleesian framework) is to redistribute from high-ability workers without discouraging their
work e¤ort. With this as the goal, the optimal use of commodity taxation is to increase the attractiveness
of earning a high income. Commodity taxes that are regressive (i.e., that fall with income) on those goods
most valued by high-ability individuals will encourage them to earn more, allowing the tax authority to levy
higher income taxes on them and redistribute more resources to those with lower ability.5
The second objective of the paper is to examine the quantitative case for capital income taxation. We
use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to show a positive correlation between
ability6 and relative preference for future consumption. Using these data to estimate a mean value for time
preference by ability quantile, we nd that optimal capital income tax rates are regressive but quantitatively
small. For the baseline example, the maximal capital income tax rate in the nonlinear case is everywhere
less than 6%, and the constrained-optimal linear capital income tax rate is 3.1%. Moreover, welfare gains
from these optimal capital income taxes are negligible.7 These results suggest that the empirical relationship
between ability and time preference justies only a small fraction of the prevailing level of capital income
taxation in developed economies.
This paper also studies the importance of preference normalization in our optimal taxation model. We
normalize preferences over commodities in two ways. These normalizations are similar to two assumptions
made by Saez (2002) in his analysis of optimal commodity taxes with preference heterogeneity. First, we
normalize preferences to eliminate any incentive for the planner to redistribute across agents based simply
on their preferences over goods. Specically, the marginal social value to a Utilitarian planner of allocating
resources to an undistorted individual is independent of that individuals preferences over consumption
goods. We also normalize preferences in a second way. We model preferences over commodities, including
future and current consumption, as having no direct e¤ect on the labor supply decisions of individuals. This
normalization contrasts with the approach in recent work by Diamond and Spinnewijn (2009), who model
preferences such that more patient individuals are more willing to work. Because the challenge of optimal tax
policy is to encourage the high-ability to work despite redistributive taxation, our normalization increases
the role for capital taxation as part of the optimal policy.
Finally, we extend our analysis of optimal capital taxation to a stochastic setting in which there is a
relationship between ex post ability and preferences over goods consumed within a period. We show that
this relationship has ambiguous e¤ects on optimal intertemporal distortions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides an illustrative example of our theoretical results in
an economy with two ability types and heterogeneity in preferences over two goods. Section 2 species a
general model of optimal taxation with heterogeneity in ability and preferences and derives conditions on
the optimal policy. In Section 3, we parameterize the model with data from the NLSY on heterogeneous
preferences for consumption over time and calculate the optimal taxes for these data. We also test the
robustness of our results to variation in individual risk aversion and labor supply elasticity. In Section 4,
we compare these results to prevailing capital income tax rates in developed economies and characterize the
relationship between ability and time preference that would be required for prevailing rates to be optimal.
Section 5 discusses the importance of preference normalization in these models. Section 6 considers the
5The standard argument against nonlinear commodity taxation is arbitrage or retrading (see Hammond 1987, Golosov and
Tsyvinski 2006). That may be an appropriate restriction for many goods, but important categories of personal expenditure
can feasibly be taxed nonlinearly or as a function of income.
6We measure ability by the survey respondents score on the cognitive ability portion of the Armed Forces Qualication Test
(AFQT). While it is impossible to measure ability perfectly, the AFQT score is commonly used, such as in the study of the
returns to education.
7 If we took into account variation around mean preference values within ability levels, the optimal taxes and welfare gains
are likely to be even smaller.
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dynamic, stochastic model. An Appendix contains technical details referred to in the text.
1 A simple example
In this section we provide a simple example that captures the main intuition behind the more general model.8
We show that, in this setting, the optimal commodity tax is regressive for the good preferred by those with
high ability. In particular, the relative tax is positive on this good for the low-ability individual, while the
high-ability individual faces no distortion.
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure 1 of two types of individuals i = f1; 2g,
where the size of each group is equal to 1=2. These individuals di¤er in wage wi, where w2 > w1. The wage
is private information to the agent. Suppose there are two commodities, c1 and c2. The utility function for
an individual with wage wi is given by:
u

ci1; c
i
2;
yi
wi

:
The planners problem is to specify consumption and income allocations for each individual to maximize
a Utilitarian social welfare function.
Problem 1 Planners problem in two-type example
max
fci1;ci2;yigi=1;2
X
i
u

ci1; c
i
2;
yi
wi

(1)
subject to
u

c21; c
2
2;
y2
w2

 u

c11; c
1
2;
y1
w2

; (2)
X
i
yi   ci1   ci2  0: (3)
Constraint (2) is an incentive compatibility constraint stating that an individual of type i = 2 prefers the
consumption and income bundle intended for it by the planner

c21; c
2
2; y
2
	
to a bundle

c11; c
1
2; y
1
	
allocated
to an individual of type i = 1.9 Constraint (3) is feasibility, where we assume that the marginal rate of
transformation of commodities is equal to 1.
Let un be the partial derivative of u (c1; c2; l) with respect to the nth argument. Note that these partial
derivatives may depend on the wage rate.10 Let  be the multiplier on constraint (2). Using the rst order
conditions for consumption in the above problem, we obtain the following expressions for an individual of
type i = 2:
u1

c21; c
2
2;
y2
w2

u2

c21; c
2
2;
y2
w2
 = 1; (4)
8Similar examples are found in Diamond (2007) and Diamond and Spinnewijn (2008). However, as discussed in Section
6, we normalize preferences in important ways that these other examples do not. This normalization has direct e¤ects on the
optimal policies we derive.
9Writing this constraint we assumed that only an individual of type i = 2 can misrepresent his type. This is easy to ensure
if the ratio w2=w1 is high enough.
10For example, using the utility function from the general model stated later, (18), u1
 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i

=
(wi)
1+(wi)
1
ci1
.
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and for the individual of type i = 1:
u1

c11; c
1
2;
y1
w1

u2

c11; c
1
2;
y1
w1
 = 1 
u2

c11;c
1
2;
y1
w2

u2

c11;c
1
2;
y1
w1

1  u1

c11;c
1
2;
y1
w2

u1

c11;c
1
2;
y1
w1

: (5)
Equation (4) shows that the consumption choices of the high-ability individual are undistorted. The
marginal rate of substitution u1()u2() is equal to the marginal rate of transformation. Equation (5) shows that
if the multiplier  on the incentive compatibility constraint is not equal to zero, then the consumption choices
of the low-ability individual are distorted. In particular, if an individuals ratio u1u2 is less than 1, the policy
has caused him to consume more of good 1 relative to good 2 than he would have chosen in autarky.
Now, suppose we impose a condition requiring that if all individuals are given the same consumption and
income allocation, the marginal utility of good 2 relative to good 1 is higher for the high-ability individual
j (type 2) than for the low-ability individual i (type 2).
Assumption 1 If wj > wi :
u2
 
c1; c2;
y
wj

u1
 
c1; c2;
y
wj
 > u2  c1; c2; ywi 
u1
 
c1; c2;
y
wi
 (6)
for any (c1; c2; y).
We now can summarize the argument in a proposition characterizing the distortions in the optimal
allocation.
Proposition 2 Suppose that

ci1; c
i
2; y
i
	
i=1;2
is an optimal allocation solving (1). Then the optimal choice
of consumption for the high-ability individual is not distorted. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the
optimal choice of consumption for the low-ability agent is distorted away from good 2 in favor of good 1:
u1

c11; c
1
2;
y1
w1

u2

c11; c
1
2;
y1
w1
 < 1:
This Proposition states that if good 2 is particularly enjoyed by high-ability workers, the planner should
impose a distortion (i.e., a positive relative tax) on the consumption of good 2 by the low-ability workers
(but not on consumption of that good by high-ability workers).11 The intuition for this result is as follows.
The planner wants to discourage a high-ability individual from deviating and claiming that he is a low type.
A high-ability agent will nd deviating less attractive if doing so will cause him to face a positive relative tax
on the good that he values highly. The cost of such a positive relative tax is a distortion in the consumption
choices by the low-ability agent. Assumption 1 ensures that the costs of such distortion are smaller than the
gain from relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint.
It is important to be clear that this result depends on preferences varying by ability level, not income.
In particular, it does not apply to goods with an income elasticity of demand greater than 1 but for which
preferences are unrelated to ability. For those goods, the inequality in (6) would be an equality because
each type would have the same ratio of marginal utilities given the same consumption and income bundle.
Instead, the case for regressive taxes requires the high-ability to prefer good 2 even when at the same income
level as the low-ability.
11Mirrlees (1986) shows a similar relationship between the marginal rates of substitution by ability level and optimal distor-
tions. He does not characterize the optimal pattern of these distortions, however, our central goal in this paper.
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2 Model
In this section, we set up a model with a continuum of ability types, as in the classic Mirrlees (1971)
framework. We derive a formula for optimal relative commodity taxes that are allowed to be nonlinear in
consumption and to depend on income. To capture preference heterogeneity, we assume that preferences
across consumption goods are a function of ability. This simplies the planners problem by retaining a
single dimension of heterogeneity: two or more dimensions introduce multiple screening problems for which
a tractable analytical approach has not been developed.12
There is a continuum of measure one of individual agents. We index agents by i 2 [0; 1]. Individuals di¤er
in their abilities, which we measure with their wages, denoted by wi and distributed according to the density
function f (w) over the interval fwmin; wmaxg. Ability is private information to the agent. The utility
function of an individual depends on 
 
wi

, so that the preference parameter for an individual depends
directly on his or her wage.
Each individual maximizes the utility function:
U
 
wi

= u
 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i; 
 
wi

: (7)
Note that utility is a function of the consumption of good 1, c1, and the consumption of good 2, c2, as well
as of labor e¤ort l, and the preference parameter 
 
wi

. Superscripts i on consumption and labor denote
the values of these variables for the individual of wage wi.
A social planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function. The planner o¤ers incentive compatible
triplets of

ci1; c
i
2; y
i
	
i
.
Problem 3
max
fci1;ci2;yigi
Z wmax
wmin
U
 
wi

f
 
wi

dwi (8)
subject to Z wmax
wmin
 
yi   ci1   ci2

f
 
wi

dwi  0; (9)
and
u

ci1; c
i
2;
yi
wi
; 
 
wi
  ucj1; cj2; yjwi ;   wi

; (10)
for all i; j.
Constraint (10) is the incentive compatibility constraint stating that an individual of type i prefers the
consumption and income allocation intended for it by the planner to an allocation intended for an individual
of type j.
Solving the planners problem in equations (8) through (10) can yield insights into the wedges that
optimal policy drives into private optimization.
It is standard to rewrite the planners problem with explicit tax functions. In this alternative formalization
of the problem, each individual maximizes the utility function (7) subject to the individuals after-tax budget
constraint,
liwi   T  wili   ci1 + t1  wili; ci1   ci2 + t2  wili; ci2  0: (11)
12See Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009), Tarkiainen and Tuomala (2007), and Judd and Su (2008) for discussions of the
approach to optimal taxation with multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
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The budget constraint requires careful examination. The nonlinear income tax T
 
wili

is a continuous,
di¤erentiable function of income yi = wili. The two other tax functions, t1
 
wili; ci1

and t2
 
wili; ci2

, are
commodity tax functions that we also assume to be continuous and di¤erentiable. Importantly, note that
we explicitly allow for the taxation of each commodity to be nonlinear in consumption of that good and to
depend on income.13 The budget constraint (11) has the multiplier :
To characterize optimal taxes with this formalization of the planners problem, we follow the formal
techniques of the Mirrleesian literature. In particular, we consider the following social planners problem:
Problem 4 Planners Problem
max
fci1;ci2;ligi
Z wmax
wmin
U
 
wi

f
 
wi

dwi (12)
subject to feasibility Z wmax
wmin
 
wili   ci1   ci2

f
 
wi

dwi  0; (13)
and incentive compatibility, which is that each individual maximizes (7) subject to (11) given tax policies
T
 
wili

; t1
 
wili; ci1

; and t2
 
wili; ci2

:
In words, the social planner chooses a tax system to maximize Utilitarian social welfare subject to a
budget constraint that assumes no government spending for simplicity. The government must also take into
account that each individual will choose labor supply to maximize his or her utility subject to the specied
tax system.
2.1 The optimal commodity choice wedge
We now derive a formula for the optimal commodity wedge, i.e., the wedge distorting commodity choices.14
We formulate the Hamiltonian from the planners problem above. The Hamiltonian includes the following
di¤erential constraint:
@U i
@wi
= uwi
 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i; 
 
wi

+ 

li

1  T 0  wili  t1yi  wili; ci1  t2yi  wili; ci2 ; (14)
derived using the envelope condition on the individuals utility maximization problem. To remove the tax
functions from this expression, we use the individuals rst order condition with respect to labor li :
uli
 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i; 
 
wi

=  wi

1  T 0  wili  t1yi  wili; ci1  t2yi  wili; ci2 : (15)
Substituting (15) into (14) yields:
@U i
@wi
= uwi
 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i; 
 
wi
  liuli  ci1; ci2; li;   wi
wi
:
The Hamiltonian is then:
H
 
wi

=
 
U
 
wi

+ 
 
wili   ci1   ci2
 i
dwi
+ 

uwi ()  l
iuli ()
wi

;
13These tax instruments are redundant, in that a single tax function of the consumption of one good and income would be
su¢ cient to characterize the full policy. Separating taxes into these functions aids interpretation.
14For a textbook treatment, see Salanie (2003), chapter 5.2.
6
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and () denotes the set of arguments of the utility function, 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i; 
 
wi

. The rst term of the Hamiltonian is the utility of the individual with wage wi. The
second is governments budget constraint multiplied by a shadow price . The third term is the evolution of
the state variable U
 
wi

with respect to wi, as derived above, and is multiplied by the costate variable .
To solve for the optimal policy, choose l and ci1 as the control variables, with c
i
2 an implicit function
dened by the budget constraint. The rst order condition with respect to c1 is:


 1  dc
i
2
dci1

i
dwi
+ 
 
uwici1 () + uwici2 ()
dci2
dci1
  l
iulici1 ()
wi
  l
iulici2 ()
wi
dci2
dci1
!
= 0;
or, rearranging
dci2
dci1
=
 

 
i
dwi   

uwici1 () 
liu
lici1
()
wi


 
i
dwi   

uwici2 () 
liu
lici2
()
wi
 :
Individuals maximizing (7) subject to (11) will allocate their after-tax income so that the following
relationships hold:
dci2
dci1
=  uci1
uci2
=  1 + t1c1
 
wili; ci1

1 + t2c2
 
wili; ci2
 (16)
so we can write:
1 + t1c1
 
wili; ci1

1 + t2c2
 
wili; ci2
 =  
i
dwi   
 
wi

uwici1 () 
liu
lici1
()
wi

 
i
dwi    (wi)

uwici2 () 
liu
lici2
()
wi
 : (17)
To fully characterize the optimal distortion to commodity purchases given by (17), we solve for  and 
 
wi

in a specic example.
2.1.1 A specic example
We assume the individual utility function is
U i = u
 
ci1; c
i
2; l
i; 
 
wi

=

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
ln ci1 +
1
1 +  (wi)
ln ci2  
1

 
li

: (18)
It is important to note that this utility function normalizes preferences over consumption goods in the two
ways mentioned in the Introduction. The rst normalization, following the techniques of Weinzierl (2009),
ensures that the marginal social value to a Utilitarian planner of allocating resources to an undistorted
individual is independent of that individuals preference parameter 
 
wi

. This prevents preference hetero-
geneity, which is inherently ordinal, from articially driving redistribution by making the cardinal utility of
consumption higher for an individual depending on his or her preferences. The second normalization sepa-
rates heterogeneity in commodity preferences from the consumption-leisure choice of individuals. Specically,
it ensures that two individuals of the same ability wi will choose the same labor e¤ort when undistorted.15
The next proposition derives an expression for optimal commodity taxes.
15Logarithmic utility of consumption makes is possible to achieve these two normalizations simultaneously. For a more
general case, the Appendix to this paper contains the details of both normalizations.
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Proposition 5 Given the individual utility function (18), the solution to the Planners Problem satises:
1 + t1c1
 
wili; ci1

1 + t2c2
 
wili; ci2
 =
f
 
wi

+ uwici1
 
1  Ft
 
wi
0B@ 11 F (wi)
R wj=wmax
wj=wi
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj
  11 F (wmin)
R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj
1CA
f (wi) + uwici2 (1  F (wi))
0B@ 11 F (wi)
R wj=wmax
wj=wi
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj
  11 F (wmin)
R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj
1CA
(19)
Proof. In the Appendix, we derive the following expressions for  and 
 
wi

:
 =
1R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
1
u
c
j
2
f (wj) dwj

 
wi

=
 
1  F  wi
0B@1  1(1 F (wi))
R wj=wmax
wj=wi
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj
1
(1 F (wmin))
R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
1
u
c
j
2
f (wj) dwj
1CA :
Using these results in expression (17), we obtain (19).
As with the conditions for optimal marginal income tax rates from, e.g., Saez (2001), concave utility
of consumption prevents result (19) from being fully closed-form, instead relying on optimal utility and
consumption levels. Nevertheless, we can establish some important lessons from it.
First, on the top type, (1  F (wmax)) is zero, and the result reduces to
1 + t1c1 (wmax)
1 + t2c2 (wmax)
= 1:
so the commodity distortion is zero on the highest ability worker.
Second, the distortion is also zero on the lowest ability worker, as the terms in large parentheses in the
numerator and denominator are zero.
In addition, examination of terms in (19) gives detail about the determinants of the optimal distortion.
The parenthetical term common to the numerator and denominator is the di¤erence in the average cost of
raising utility for the population with wages above wi and for the entire population. It is positive, since if it
were negative the planner could raise social welfare by incentive-compatible and feasible transfers of c2 from
the overall population to the high-ability. As such, this di¤erence measures the loss in welfare that results
from having to satisfy the incentives of the high-ability rather than being able to spread resources across all
workers. When this loss is large, the optimal distortion to consumption at wage wi is larger because that
distortion discourages higher-ability workers from working less.
The relationship between uwici1 and uwici2 determines whether policy discourages consumption of good
1 or good 2 for intermediate ability levels. With utility function (18) this relationship is determined by
the sign of 0
 
wi

. If 0
 
wi

< 0, then high-ability workers relatively prefer good 2, and uwici1 < 0 while
uwici2 > 0. Then, the ratio on the right-hand side of (19) is less than one, and the optimal distortion
discourages marginal consumption of good 2. That is, the good preferred by the more able workers ought to
be marginally taxed.
The term f
 
wi

provides a measure of the share of the population distorted by a given commodity
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tax. When this share is high, the optimal consumption distortion is smaller, as the planner wants to avoid
distortions on large sub-populations. Mathematically, f
 
wi

enters both the numerator and the denominator,
pushing the tax ratio toward unity.
The term
 
1  F  wi is the share of individuals with higher wages who are encouraged to exert more
e¤ort due to the distortion at wi. The larger this term, the more valuable is the distortion to the planner,
all else the same. Mathematically,
 
1  F  wi multiplies the terms in the numerator and denominator that
push the tax ratio away from unity. We know that
 
1  F  wi falls as the wage rises, so this lowers the
optimal distortion as we move up the ability distribution.
Finally, suppose there exists an ability level ~w such that the distribution of all abilities above that level
follows a Pareto form, as in Saez (2001). Then for all such wi > ~w;
wif(wi)
(1 F (wi)) is constant. Rearrange the
expression (19) to obtain
1 + t1c1
 
wili; ci1

1 + t2c2
 
wili; ci2
 =
wif(wi)
1 F (wi) + uwici1w
i

1
1 F (wi)
R wj=wmax
wj=wi
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj   11 F (wmin)
R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
1
u
c
j
2
f
 
wj

dwj

wif(wi)
1 F (wi) + uwici2w
i

1
1 F (wi)
R wj=wmax
wj=wi
1
u
c
j
2
f (wj) dwj   11 F (wmin)
R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
1
u
c
j
2
f (wj) dwj
 :
From above, we know that the parenthetical terms are positive; they are also increasing in wi following
the same argument. Therefore, assuming uwici1 < 0 and uwici2 > 0, whether the optimal tax on good 2 is
regressive or progressive in the upper tail of the income distribution depends on how quickly uwici1 and uwici2
converge to zero. If they do not converge quickly enough, the tax on good 2 is progressive in the tail.
Though these interpretations aid in understanding result (19), we may want to reformulate that result
in terms of observable quantities in the spirit of Saez (2001). The Appendix derives the following version of
result (19):
1 + t1c1
1 + t2c2
=
wif
 
wi

+ "ci1wi
1+t1c1
1+t2c2
 
1  F  wi  11 F (wi) R wj=wmaxwj=wi y^jy^i f  wj dwj   11 F (wmin) R wj=wmaxwj=wmin y^jy^i f  wj dwj
wif (wi) + "ci2wi (1  F (wi))

1
1 F (wi)
R wj=wmax
wj=wi
y^j
y^i f (w
j) dwj   11 F (wmin)
R wj=wmax
wj=wmin
y^j
y^i f (w
j) dwj

(20)
where "cmw denotes the Frisch elasticity (holding marginal utility constant) of consumption of good m with
respect to the wage, y^i is the disposable income individual i would choose to earn in an economy with income
taxes only (i.e., before the introduction of optimal commodity taxes, the planner can observe the distribution
of y^i). This alternative representation of the main result on optimal commodity taxes can be more readily
applied with observable data.
If we restrict attention to commodity taxes that are a linear function of the consumption of the good, a
modication of result (19) conrms the results of the previous literature (e.g., Saez 2002, Salanie 2003) that
goods preferred by the highly able ought to be taxed.
The results of Sections 1 and 2 suggest that optimal commodity taxes may be regressive on goods preferred
by the high-ability, but the analytical expression (19) makes it clear that the shape of optimal commodity
taxes will depend on many details of the economy. In the next two sections, we turn to a quantitative
study of optimal commodity taxation when the commodities in the utility function are current and future
consumption (savings).
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3 Optimal capital income taxes
We begin our study of capital income taxation by examining empirical evidence on the relationship between
ability and time preference, or intertemporal discounting. We then simulate optimal capital income taxes
justied by this relationship.
Throughout this section, we use a generalized form of the utility function (18) in which the utility from
consumption is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), rather than logarithmic:
U =
1
'i
  

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
!  
ci1
(1 )   1
(1  ) +

1
1 +  (wi)
  ci2(1 )   1
(1  )  
1

 
li
!
(21)
where 'i is a normalization term derived in the Appendix that causes the marginal social welfare of resources
allocated to individuals at their private optima to be independent of preferences and to match the values
implied by a utilitarian social welfare function as in (8) operating on the utility function in (18). As a
baseline case, we assume  = 2 and  = 3.
3.1 Evidence on ability and time preference
A sizeable literature exists on measuring and explaining di¤erences in saving behavior across income groups.
In general, this research has acknowledged the possible role of heterogeneous time preferences but has not
found solid evidence of their importance. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) build a lifecycle model
with individual uncertainty, precautionary saving, means-tested social insurance, and homogeneous time
preferences. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), they argue that their model
can explain the wide variation in saving rates across education (as a proxy for income) levels without
heterogeneity in time preferences. Samwick (1998) uses Survey of Consumer Finances data on wealth and
income to estimate a lifecycle model and notes that variations in wealth proles not explained by his model
may be due to variation in time preferences, though he does not have direct evidence for them. Dynan,
Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) nd a "strong, positive relationship between saving rates and lifetime income,"
using data from the PSID, but they argue that preference di¤erences cannot explain their ndings (at least,
without a strong bequest motive). Lawrance (1991) calculates annual time preference rates using data on
food consumption and nds that implied discount factors rise with income, but Dynan (1993) shows that
Lawrances results are sensitive to the inclusion of controls.
Though this literature casts doubt on the potential for heterogeneous time preferences to justify substan-
tial capital taxation, little if any research exists on whether saving preferences are related to innate ability,
the relationship of interest for our analysis.
For direct evidence on that question, we perform new analysis using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). The NLSY consists of a nationally representative sample of individuals born
between 1957 and 1964, rst interviewed in 1979, and interviewed annually or biannually since. The NLSY
contains data on individualsnet worth and income over time, allowing us to roughly estimate saving rates
as described below.
The key advantage of the NLSY for our purposes is that it includes a standard, direct measure of ability.
This allows us to relate a measure of ability, not income, to time preferences. In 1980, the NLSY administered
the Armed Forces Qualication Test (AFQT) to 94 percent of its participants. This test measured individuals
aptitudes in a wide range of areas, including some mechanical skills relevant to military service.
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We use an aggregation of scores in some of the areas covered by the AFQT as the indicator of ability16 .
This aggregation, the AFQT89, is calculated by the Center for Human Resource Research at Ohio State
University, as follows:
Creation of this revised percentile score, called AFQT89, involves (1) computing a verbal
composite score by summing word knowledge and paragraph comprehension raw scores; (2) con-
verting subtest raw scores for verbal, math knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; (3) multiplying
the verbal standard score by two; (4) summing the standard scores for verbal, math knowledge,
and arithmetic reasoning; and (5) converting the summed standard score to a percentile.
Our measure of preferences will be the discount factor implied by using NLSY data on income and net
worth in a simple model of individual optimization. Suppose individuals live for three periods. In the rst
two periods, roughly corresponding to ages 20 through 42 and 43 through 65, they work, consume, and
perhaps borrow or save. In the third period, they are retired and live for 23 years (for simplicity, as this
makes all three periods of similar length). The individual solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
c1;c2;c3

ln (c1) +  ln (c2) + 
2 ln (c3)  v (y1; y2)

subject to  
(y1   c1)R2 + (y2   c2)

R  c3 = 0:
where ct and yt are consumption and income in period t;  is the discount factor across 23-year periods (i.e.,
if the one-year-ahead discount factor is , then  = 23), R = (1:05)23 is the average return to saving over
a 23-year period, and v () is an unspecied function for the disutility of earning income.
We make the assumption that an individuals total value of income prior to age 43 is identical to the
income it will earn from age 43 until retirement. In the notation of the model, we assume y1 = y2 for all
individuals. The rst-order conditions of the individuals problem yield the following expression for :
1 +  + 2 =
y1
c1
1 +R
R
:
or
 =
1
2
 
 3 + 4y1
c1
1 +R
R
 1
2
  1
!
As expected, the higher is income relative to consumption, the greater the estimated  for an individual. We
drop 37 individuals whose estimated  is negative or exceeds two, leaving 7,008 observations.
To estimate , we need values for y1 and c1 for each individual. For y1, we use the NLSYs observations on
income over time for each individual to calculate the "future value" of income earned prior to and including
2004.17 Formally, y1 =
2004X
t=1979
R
1
23 (2004 t)yt. Using the full time series of income rather than simply the most
16The AFQT most likely measures some combination of innate ability and accumulated achievement. To the extent that
more innately patient individuals invest more in human capital and thereby have higher AFQT scores because of achievement,
not ability, our analysis will be biased toward nding a stronger relationship between ability and time preferences than that
which truly holds.
17We do not observe income in all years for each individual. To obtain an income gure comparable to ending net worth for
each individual, we calculate the future value of the observed incomes for each individual. Then, we scale that future value
by the maximum number of years observable over the number of years observed for each individual. We also do not observe
initial Net Worth. However, if we control for net worth in 1985, just six years after the survey began, the coe¢ cient on AFQT
is hardly changed.
11
recent observation of income is important for two reasons. First, it gives a better measure of the individuals
likely lifetime or permanent income. Second, to calculate c1, we assume that any income not accumulated
as net worth by 2004 was consumed. Formally, we denote the NLSY variable "family net worth" NW and
calculate c1 = y1  NW .18
In Table 1, we show the mean and standard deviations of  along with the implied values for 
 
wi

,
all by AFQT quintile. Note that  is related to the preference parameter 
 
wi

from the utility function
(21) by 
 
wi

=
 

 
wi
( 123 ) : The variation in  within AFQT quintiles is large relative to the variation
across wage levels. Of course, the data are likely to be very noisy, and our inference of  is based on a highly
simplied model. Nevertheless, our ndings are consistent with the ndings of the literature cited above that
relates saving to income and with Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2006), who nd a "positive relationship
between AFQT score and the propensity to have positive net assets" in the NLSY.
Simple AFQT quintile means of  are likely to be misleading, however, as they fail to control for variables
correlated with both ability and saving behavior. Table 2 shows the results of a regression that controls for
some observable characteristics:
ln  = 1age+ 2age
2 + 3gender + 4 ln (income) + 5 ln (AFQT ) :
where "income" is the future value of income, y1, described above. This regression yields a highly signicant
estimate for 5 of 0.026 (standard error of 0.004).
19 ;20 Exponentiating this equation and using the estimate
for 5 yields
 = 0:356 (AFQT )
0:026
; (22)
where the constant multiplying the right-hand-side is determined by matching the value of  for the mid-
dle AFQT quintile. Expression (22) allows us to calculate, from the average AFQT score by quintile, a
"regression-based " for each quintile that can be compared to the simple means in Table 1. The results are
shown in Table 3, along with the implied values of 
 
wi

and the mean reported wages by AFQT quintile.21
We can use the 
 
wi

and wi values in Table 3 to estimate the following functional relationship:

 
wi

= 1:0529
 
wi
 0:0037
: (23)
Expression (23) allows us to predict 
 
wi

for a wide range of wages.
To make clearer the di¤erence between the values of  by AFQT quintile shown in Tables 1 and 3, Figure
1 shows both the "Mean " and the "Regression-based " plotted against the mean wage by AFQT quintile.
18Our data do not include components of individuals expected future income, such as Social Security payments or other
social transfers. To the extent that these omissions bias down the estimate of net worth, we will understate saving rates.
Therefore, if these transfers are progressive, we will be overestimating the slope of discount factors versus ability. In a similar
way, expected future gifts and inheritances are not taken into account in the data. To the extent that these are increasing in
recipient income, we are underestimating the slope of discount factors versus ability.
19We also have run simulations controlling for the slope of income during the 1979-2004 period and over the past ten years
for each individual. These controls reduce the coe¢ cient on AFQT to 0.021 and 0.014, but it remains signicant at the 1%
level. Note that the diminution of the coe¢ cient implies an even weaker relationship between ability and time preferences.
20Measurement error likely a¤ects both our estimates of ability and discounting, though bias would be introduced only by
error in the former. While AFQT is an imperfect measure of ability, its retest reliability is very high. Moreover, if AFQT
mismeasures ability, it is unclear whether that biases our results down or up. It may be that AFQT measures those parts of
ability that are particularly highly correlated with preferences (i.e., ability to delay gratication, cognitive alacrity), and a more
accurate measure of ability would show less relationship with preferences.
21We compute wages from the total wage and salary income divided by the total hours worked in 1992, as reported in 1993.
We calculate mean wages by AFQT quintile limiting the sample to workers who reported more than 1,000 hours worked. Using
all workers does not change the pattern, but all wage levels rise because some workers with low reported hours have high
imputed hourly wages.
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The atter slope of the latter line reects the variation explained by the control variables in the regression
summarized in Table 2.
3.2 Optimal capital income taxes
To simulate optimal capital income taxes using the estimated form for 
 
wi

in expression (23), we specify
a wage (wi) distribution, calculate the implied values for 
 
wi

, and numerically simulate the planners
problem in (8) ; (9), and (10). We also simulate an augmented planners problem that limits the planner to
a constant rate of capital income taxation. Formally, we add to the planners problem the constraint that
the intertemporal wedge be constant:
uci1
uci2
=
ucj1
ucj2
(24)
for all types i; j. Recall that the assumed individual utility function is shown in (21).
We use a wage distribution that runs from $4 to $100 with 25 equally-spaced discrete values. Based on
Saez (2001), we assume that the distribution of the population across these wages is lognormal up to $62.50
and Pareto with a parameter value of two for higher wages. We calibrate the lognormal distribution with
the 2007 wage distribution for full-time workers in the United States as reported in the Current Population
Survey.
To measure the intertemporal wedge we use the expression:
 = 1 
u
ci1
u
ci2
  1
r
(25)
where r is the annual rate of return to savings.22 The variable  measures the relative distortion toward
good 1 and away from good 2 at a given income level. Under the capital income tax interpretation,  is
the implicit tax on the interest income earned on good 2, i.e., capital. If this expression is positive, the tax
policy is discouraging future consumption relative to current consumption. More informally, it is taxing the
return to saving, so we will refer to it as the implied capital income tax.
Figure 2 shows the optimal nonlinear capital income tax rates that are justied by the relationship we
estimate from the NLSY data. In the baseline case, where  = 2 and  = 3, optimal capital income tax
rates are less than 6 percent everywhere, at over much of the distribution, and declining at higher incomes.
The constrained-optimal linear capital income tax rate is 3.1% (not shown). The welfare gains from optimal
capital income taxation given the empirical 
 
wi

are negligible.
This result is robust to alternative values of the parameters of the utility function and form for the
wage distribution. Figure 2 also shows optimal capital income taxes for a range of values for  and , as
well as one in which we use a lognormal distribution of wages rather than a combination lognormal-Pareto
distribution. Tax rates are consistent with the baseline case except when we raise risk aversion () or the
elasticity of labor supply

1
 1

to high levels. Even in these cases, however, justied rates are small relative
to prevailing rates (as will be discussed in detail below). Specically, when  = 4 (rather than the baseline
value of 2), the average of the optimal nonlinear capital income taxes is 6.9%, which is also the best linear
capital tax rate. When  = 1:5 (rather than the baseline value of 3), the average of the optimal nonlinear
capital income taxes is also 6.9%, while the best linear capital tax rate is 6.0%. Welfare gains from optimal
22 In the simulations, we assume that 1 + r = 1R
(wi)f(wi)
. The implicit tax  is on net capital income, i.e., the implicit
after-tax return to saving is (1 + r (1  )) :
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capital taxation are negligible in all cases.
One variation to the model that has the potential to generate large optimal capital income taxes is to
make the social welfare function more concave. In the extreme case of a Rawlsian social welfare function,
for example, the optimal capital income tax rate averages 37.1% across the population, and the constrained-
optimal linear capital income tax rate is 32.9%.
4 Comparing optimal to existing capital income taxes
In this section, we compare the empirical relationship between time preferences and ability to that which
would be required to justify prevailing levels of capital income taxes in developed economies, using our
baseline model specication.
One natural measure of the taxation of capital income is the level of statutory tax rates on various forms
of capital income. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2008) reports
tax rates on corporate prots and capital income earned by individuals. Figure 3 shows the range of the
combined impact of these statutory rates across OECD member countries for 2007. The average combined
corporate and personal statutory rate on distributed corporate prots was 42.4 percent in 2007, down from
50 percent in 2000.
An alternative measure is the "tax ratio" of capital income tax revenue to total capital income. This
measure has weaknessesfor example, it is backward-lookingbut it has the virtue of implicitly controlling
for the complicated exemptions, denitional variations, and tax incentives that cause the economic extent
of capital taxation to di¤er from that implied by statutory rates. Carey and Rabesona (2004) calculate the
tax ratio for capital income across sixteen OECD countries in 2000 to be 46.3.
Taken together, these measures suggest that tax rates on capital income in developed economies today
are over 40 percent. These rates are generally at or somewhat progressive, as some countries use corporate
tax rates that rise with corporate prots and the personal taxes paid on corporate income are in some cases
tied to progressive tax rates on labor income.
To nd the 
 
wi

functions that yield constrained-optimal linear23 intertemporal wedges corresponding
to prevailing capital income tax rates, we continue to model the function 
 
wi

as a two-parameter power
function

 
wi

=  
 
wi
"
; (26)
where  and " are scalars. We x 
 
wi = $28

= 1:0413, the value implied by our analysis of the NLSY
data, to ensure comparability of these preferences to our empirical estimates. Then, we use the wage (wi)
distribution and utility function (21) from Section 3 with  = 2 and  = 3, and we vary the values of  and
" in (26) while simulating the planners problem in (8) ; (9), (10), and (24).
Figure 4 plots the 
 
wi

required for the best linear intertemporal wedge to imply capital income tax
rates of 40%, 20%, and 10% as well as the values for 
 
wi

from our analysis of the NLSY data. To aid
intuition, Figure 5 plots the conventional annual discount factor 
 
wi

implied by these 
 
wi

. As these
Figures make clear, the empirical relationship between time preferences and ability is far weaker than that
which would justify the capital income tax rates prevailing in developing economies today.
23Existing capital tax rates are usually constant, while optimal wedges are generally not constant, so we in fact match the
constrained-optimal linear intertemporal wedge to prevailing rates.
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5 Role of preference normalization
In this section, we explore the role of preference normalization in the study of optimal commodity taxation.
In this paper, we normalize preferences in two ways: to neutralize the role of preferences over goods in how
much the planner values individuals; and to neutralize the e¤ect of preferences over goods on the labor
supply choices of individuals.
First, we normalize so as to eliminate any incentive for the planner to redistribute across agents based
simply on their preferences over goods. Consider the following two representations of the same preferences
over consumption goods:
U =

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
ln ci1 +
1
1 +  (wi)
ln ci2  
1

 
li

(27)
and
U = ln ci1 +
1
 (wi)
ln ci2  
1

 
li

; (28)
Expression (27) normalizes preferences as in our main analysis, whereas (28) does not. Specically, starting
at individuals undistorted optimal allocations, a planner using (27) has no desire to redistribute across
preference types (conditional on the wage) because the marginal social value of resources is equalized across
preference types. In contrast, a planner using (28) obtains a larger increase in social welfare from allocating
a marginal unit of resources to the individual with lower 
 
wi

. Therefore, optimal tax policy will favor
individuals with lower 
 
wi

. Importantly, if we were to multiply the rst two terms of expression (28) by

 
wi

, the impact of preferences over consumption goods would reverse even though we would be using
an observationally equivalent representation of them. In that case, lower 
 
wi

types would yield smaller
increases in social welfare to the planner. For utility that is of the constant relative risk aversion form
(rather than logarithmic) over consumption, the Appendix shows the derivation of a normalizing factor that
generates the same marginal social welfare for each type as does (27) for a utilitarian planner.
Second, we use a representation of preferences that implies no relationship between preferences across
goods and the willingness to work. For utility that is of the constant relative risk aversion form (rather than
logarithmic) over consumption, this representation is:
U =
  

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
!  
ci1
(1 )   1
(1  ) +

1
1 +  (wi)
  ci2(1 )   1
(1  )  
1


yi
wi
!
To see that chosen income is independent of preferences with this representation, solve the individuals
maximization problem with respect to the budget constraint:
yi   ci1   ci2 = 0:
The individuals rst order conditions yield:
yi =
 
wi
 
 1+ ;
so that income earned does not depend on preferences 
 
wi

. Without this normalization, preferences over
goods would be related to preferences between leisure and consumption.
Diamond and Spinnewijn (2009) use a representation of preferences similar to (28) to study optimal
capital income taxation. Their social welfare function puts a small enough weight on the high-ability to
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ensure redistribution away from them, so they address the issues raised by our rst normalization in an
alternative way. Related to our second normalization, their preferred functional form reects a greater
willingness to work among the highly-able. If we simulate the optimal policy model of Section 2 with that
functional form (i.e., without our second normalization), the average optimal capital tax rate falls from 3.1%
to 1.6%. Intuitively, the relationship between patience and willingness to work reduces the distortionary
impact of labor income taxes on the patient and, therefore, the high income earners. This makes the benets
of capital taxes smaller, so the optimal policy avoids them. Therefore, our second normalization causes us
to overestimate optimal capital taxes relative to the most natural alternative.
These normalizations are similar to two assumptions Saez (2002) states in his analysis of this topic.
His Assumption 1 is that the planners marginal social welfare weights on individuals are independent of
their tastes for goods, conditional on their incomes. Our rst normalization pursues the same neutrality of
marginal social welfare weights, though we use the laissez-faire allocations rather than the optimal allocations
as the starting point for the normalization. This normalization captures the idea that the government
does not want to redistribute resources across individuals simply because they will spend them on di¤erent
consumption baskets. Our second normalization parallels Saezs Assumption 2, which states that, conditional
their income, individualslabor supply responses to tax changes are una¤ected by their preferences. Though
our normalization focuses on isolating from preferences the chosen level of labor supply, rather than its
response to tax changes, the idea of the two approaches is similar. Intuitively, this normalization means that
individuals choose how much to work without regard to how they plan to spend their disposable income.
Saez notes that both of his Assumptions seem like reasonable ones in the context of capital income taxation.
We take a similar perspective, believing that our normalizations provide a natural, and neutral, starting
point for modeling preference heterogeneity and its e¤ects on optimal commodity taxation.
6 Optimal Capital Taxation when Stochastic Abilities are Related
to Preferences
In this section, we extend our study of optimal capital taxation when preferences vary with ability to a
stochastic setting. Agents start with a common wage w1 and consume one good c1 in the rst period. In
the second period, their wage can take one of two values wi2 or w
i0
2 , and they can consume two goods c2 and
x2. Agents with the low second-period wage have a relative preference for x2 over c2.
6.1 Individuals problem
An individuals problem in this setting with no policy is:
max
ct;yt
"
u (c1)  v

y1
w1

+
X
i
"
1
1 +  (wi)
ln ci2 +

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
lnxi2   v

yi2
wi2
##
s.t. feasibility
R (y1   c1) +
 
yi2   ci2   xi2
  0
for all i, where i is the probability of wage wi2 :
P
i = 1, and 
 
wi

measures the preference for good x2
in period two.
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The individual chooses to satisfy a standard stochastic Euler:
u0 (c1) = R
X
i
1
2
"
1
1 +  (wi)
u0
 
ci2

+

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
u0
 
xi2
#
6.2 Planners problem
The social planners problem is analogous to the static problem in Section 2:
Problem 6
max
ct;yt
"
u (c1)  v

y1
w1

+
IX
i=1
i
"
1
1 +  (wi)
ln ci2 +

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
lnxi2   v

yi2
wi2
##
(29)
subject to feasibility
R (y1   c1) +
X
i
 
yi2   ci2   xi2
  0; (30)
and incentive compatibility in period 2
1
1 +  (wi)
ln ci2 +

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
lnxi2   v

yi2
wi2

 1
1 +  (wi)
ln ci
0
2 +

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
lnxi
0
2   v
 
yi
0
2
wi2
!
; (31)
for all i; i0.
Without loss of generality, suppose that wi2 > w
i0
2 so that individuals with second-period ability w
i
2 are
tempted to claim ability wi
0
2 , but not vice versa. Then 
i0ji > 0 and iji
0
= 0, and the rst-order conditions
of the planners problem yield:
u0 (c1) = R
2664
P
i 12

1
1+(wi)u
0  ci2+ (wi)1+(wi)u0  xi2 
i
0ji 1
2

1
1+(wi)

u0

ci
0
2

  u0  ci2+ (wi)1+(wi) u0 xi02   u0  xi2
3775 : (32)
To interpret this condition, note that the rst row on the right-hand side is the right-hand side of the
standard stochastic Euler that the individual chooses to satisfy if left undistorted. Therefore, the second
row on the right-hand side determines the treatment of the intertemporal margin.
The second row on the right-hand side of (32) is positive, but it is subtracted from the rst row. This
lowers the marginal utility of rst-period consumption relative to the individuals undistorted optimum. In
other words, an intertemporal distortion that discourages saving is optimal in this setting. This does not
tell us, however, whether the ability to tax commodities in a nonlinear, income-dependent way increases or
decreases the optimal level of capital income taxes. While an analytical answer to this question is unavailable,
simple numerical examples show that the e¤ect of this sophisticated commodity taxation is ambiguous.
In the numerical simulations, we consider two planners problems. The rst is the social planners problem
shown in equations (29), (30), and (31): we call this the optimal model. The second constrains this planner
to tax commodities in the second period at the same rate for individuals with both wage realizations, so
that:
1
1 +  (wi)
u0
 
ci2

=

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
u0
 
xi2

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for i = fi; i0g. We call this the restricted model. For either problem, dene the intertemporal wedge (the
implicit capital tax) as  in:
u0 (c1) = R (1  )
X
i
1
2
"
1
1 +  (wi)
u0
 
ci2

+

 
wi

1 +  (wi)
u0
 
xi2
#
;
which means that  is the distortion to the individuals private intertemporal optimization.24 Assume
u (c) = ln c; R = 1:05; and R = 1.
For the rst numerical example, suppose wages are
w1 = 4
wi2 = f2; 6g
and

 
wi

= f0:75; 0:25g :
Note that the individual with the low wage relatively prefers x2.
The optimal values of  in these two cases are:
optimal = 0:061
restricted = 0:051
For the second example, assume the same economy except that preferences are more similar across wage
types in the second period.

 
wi

= f0:75; 0:50g :
Simulating the same planners problems yields the following results:
optimal = 0:0861
restricted = 0:0866:
In the rst case, allowing for optimal commodity taxation increased the size of the optimal intertemporal
distortion. In the second case, it decreased it.
Therefore, optimal capital taxes may be more useful or less useful to a tax authority who confronts an
economy in which stochastic abilities are associated with preferences for particular goods.
7 Conclusion
Among others, Mirrlees (1976) and Saez (2002) have argued that goods preferred by the high-ability ought
to be taxed as part of an optimal tax policy that seeks to redistribute toward the (unobservably) low-ability.
We show that, in contrast to these previous results, optimal commodity taxation when preferences vary with
ability may be regressive in income on those goods preferred by those who are more able. We obtain this
result by allowing taxes on goods to be nonlinear functions of income and the consumption of the good,
which is plausible for many important categories of consumption such as education, health, housing, and
24Note that  is dened here as on the capital stock, not on the income from capital (as in the previous sections).
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future consumption.
The logic for taxing goods preferred by those with high ability has been used to argue for positive
capital income taxation, for example by Banks and Diamond (2008). We examine data on preferences for
current relative to future consumption and nd that the relationship between ability and time discounting
is unlikely to justify more than a small fraction of the substantial capital income taxation prevailing in
developed economies today.
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Bottom 2 3 4 Top
Mean δ 0.336 0.374 0.394 0.418 0.466
Std. Dev. of δ 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.25
Implied α(wi) 1.0486 1.0437 1.0413 1.0387 1.0338
AFQT89 quintile
Table 1.  Summary of δ by AFQT quintile
age ‐2.62E‐02 2.97E‐02 ‐0.88
agesq 8.80E‐04 8.36E‐04 1.05
sex 1.16E‐02 8.15E‐03 1.42
ln(fvincome)** 1.69E‐01 7.61E‐03 22.15
ln(afqt)** 2.60E‐02 4.46E‐03 5.82
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1% level or lower
Observations 7,008                   
F‐statistic 203.98                
R‐squared 0.127                   
Table 2.  Results of regression of log of discount factor, 
ln(delta), on ability and controls
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T‐statistic
Bottom 2 3 4 Top
Regression‐based δ 0.377 0.389 0.394 0.398 0.400
Implied α(wi) 1.0435 1.0418 1.0413 1.0410 1.0406
wi  $12.27 16.21 19.20 21.62 25.73
Table 3.  Regression‐based δ by AFQT quintile
AFQT89 quintile
       



 
